










































 Pittsburgh like most large metropolitan regions in the past half century has undertaken a 
variety of economic development strategies, the most heralded and analyzed was the 
"Renaissance" that began in the late 1940s and extended into the 1960s. Renaissance emphasized 
the redevelopment of downtown, the clean-up of the environment, and the improvement of 
infrastructure as a means to make the city and region more attractive to business. The attention 
paid to these aspects of Renaissance has often overshadowed more specific efforts aimed at 
industrial development, which were also part of the Renaissance program. One strategy, for 
example, followed conventional lines of surveying the region's industrial base, determining 
companies' needs, inventorying available sites, and actively promoting the retention and 
attraction of companies.  The Regional Industrial Development Corporation (RIDC) and its 
successful industrial parks evolved from this approach.1 
 Another strategy was industry targeting. In the 1960s and early 1970s public and private 
leaders mounted a substantial effort to promote the Pittsburgh region's existing transportation 
industry as a center for the emerging urban rapid transportation market.  The promotion of a 
specific industry through local policies and actions is often called industry targeting.  Industry 
targeting is a means to strategically plan economic development efforts and focus limited 
resources.  Civic leaders identify an industry in which a region is believed to have a comparative 
advantage and shape policies that develop the targeted industry and/or attract new companies of 
that industry, thereby expanding the economic base of the region.  The creation and 
implementation of a program and policies to develop the targeted industry inherently involve 
politics.  Industry targeting programs also involve business, labor, and government, each with its 
own interests, constituencies, and goals.  In addition to the methodological problems of selecting 
an industry that may succeed locally in the national or global market place, achieving consensus 
among interested parties, or at least enough consensus to enact and carry out expensive public 
programs, presents major difficulties for policy makers.2 
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 The selection of the rapid transit industry for targeting in the 1960s addressed two issues 
for the Pittsburgh region. Despite national acclaim by 1960 for its Renaissance redevelopment 
program, much more needed to be accomplished in the quest to reposition Pittsburgh for the 
second half of the century.  In addition to improvements in housing and cultural facilities, 
economic diversification and mass transportation remained at the top of the civic agenda. 
Industrial development efforts had not substantially diversified the region's manufacturing base, 
which was recognized as late as 1963 to be still perilously concentrated on primary metals.3  At 
the same time, the success of new expressways from fast growing eastern and western suburbs to 
downtown and a network of public parking garages had aggravated traffic congestion, as 
commuters fled a fragmented number of independent transit providers for the privacy of their 
automobiles. The metropolitan region needed an effective mass transportation system. 
 With nearly twenty years of fruitful, indeed unprecedented, coordinated civic action, as 
well as the perception of being a leader in urban renewal in post-war America, Pittsburgh's civic 
leaders did not hesitate to address the daunting transportation and economic diversification 
problems. Rapid transit became the solution for both issues.4  Operating within the city’s typical 
Renaissance framework, corporate executives and public officials formed a working partnership. 
Allegheny County became responsible for developing the rapid transit system, and non-profit 
organizations with the backing of Richard King Mellon and the Allegheny Conference on 
Community Development undertook the promotion of the local industry. They created a 
three-pronged transit strategy by the mid-1960s: (1) build an innovative rapid transportation 
system for Allegheny County, (2) use it as a showcase for testing and marketing rapid transit 
hardware developed by Pittsburgh based corporations, and (3) promote the city as a center of the 
rapid transportation industry. 
 For the innovative system, they settled on Westinghouse's automated, rubber-tired vehicle 
running on a separate elevated, cement guide way, dubbed "Skybus."  The public/private 
partnership assiduously pursued its rapid transit program through the 1960s, but by the early 
1970s the Skybus program for Allegheny County was in trouble and soon lost its critical state 
funding. With the program's demise the industry targeting strategy failed as well. The collapse of 
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the winning Renaissance formula is noteworthy and instructive. The innovative character of 
Westinghouse's technology opened it to criticism, and a competitive technology advanced by 
another local corporation divided the business community at the moment when Richard K. 
Mellon’s death removed his unifying leadership.  At the same time, the construction of a rapid 
transit system as the demonstration aspect of the strategy depended on local and state 
governments' decisions to incur public expense, subjecting the strategy to the vicissitudes of local 
politics.  In the past the concentration of private and public power in two powerful figures, 
Mellon and Democratic boss David L. Lawrence respectively, their informal partnership, and the 
efficacy of their organizations simply bulldozed political opposition to massive renewal 
programs and to behind-closed-doors, top down planning.  By the late 1960s, however, the loss 
of this leadership (Lawrence died in 1966) weakened the public/private partnership and rendered 
the public decision-making bodies vulnerable to new populist political sentiment, galvinized by 
the riots in the aftermath of Martin Luther King’s assassination, which championed the interests 
of groups left out of the planning process and the benefits of the proposed system 
 This case study of industry targeting in Pittsburgh cannot shed light on the process by 
which civic leaders selected the rapid transit industry.  Neither oral interviews, nor extant 
documentation present a clear picture of this decision-making process.  While the literature of 
industry targeting focuses on approaches to industry selection, writers lament the lack of studies 
on implementation experiences and outcomes.  The Skybus experience in Pittsburgh bears out 
the essentially political nature of industry targeting. The successful outcome of a targeting 
program may well, as this Pittsburgh example suggests, depend more on effective leadership and 
local politics than on the quality of the selection process and the vigorous pursuit of traditional 
economic development strategies in support of the targeted industry.5  
  . 
The Context for Industry Targeting in Pittsburgh 
 In 1960 Pittsburgh had just experienced 15 years of redevelopment that re-established it 
as not only a powerful industrial city but also a dynamic city with a revitalized central business 
district, new pollution controls on water and air, expanded educational and research facilities, a 
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forward-looking business elite, a successful public-private partnership, and an increasingly 
positive public image within the nation.6  
 At the same time, important changes in the political economy of the nation and region 
were making themselves felt locally. The transformation of the national economy away from 
older smokestack manufacturing to service and technologically advanced industries was well 
underway. Pittsburgh was leading the way in deindustrialization. Production workers in 
manufacturing declined 31 percent from 1947 to 1967, and the region's share of the national steel 
output declined steadily after 1950. The population of the region was growing slowly since 1930, 
and net migration had been negative in every decade since the 1920s.7 The population of the 
metropolitan area actually peaked in 1960. While it was not easy in 1960 for Pittsburghers to 
foresee how dramatic the changes in Pittsburgh’s economy would be, it was apparent that 
unbridled optimism was not warranted. Civic leaders had for years called for diversification of 
the regional economic base in order to diminish the extreme impacts of recession years and 
wished to find a new growth industry.8 Thus, any regional policy, and most especially industry 
targeting, would be significantly constrained by developments in both the national economy as 
the post-war boom was winding down and the local economy in which relative decline had 
already manifest itself and absolute decline was waiting impatiently in the wings. 
 The 1960s also brought forth many calls across America for solutions to the urban 
transportation problem. New expressways and steady increases in the use of automobiles coupled 
with decades of deteriorating public transportation led to unprecedented congestion and air 
pollution in the nation's cities.  Expressway construction could not keep pace with America's love 
affair with the automobile, and vociferous protests at the destructive impact of expressways on 
cities threatened the completion of many planned projects.  An obvious solution, it seemed, was 
to create modern, attractive, efficient public mass transportation that would encourage 
commuters to abandon their automobiles.  With hindsight the merits, or perhaps more accurately 
the practicality, of this approach seem weak.  The powerful highway lobby -- the auto 
manufacturers, oil companies, highway construction firms, government agencies, and 
sympathetic politicians --formed an immovable force against which mass transportation interests 
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fought ineffectively. The consumer's attachment to the automobile also turned out to be more 
serious than many experts judged. Moreover, deteriorating social relations between whites and 
African Americans and between the wealthy and poor spurred suburban flight and the desire for 
privacy in residence and commuting. The unparalleled flexibility of the automobile (ignoring 
congestion) proved to be a virtue without peer. The rise of the automobile continued unabated.9  
However, urban planners, many businessmen, a few politicians, and some of the citizenry 
thought differently, putting mass transit on many public and civic agendas. Many experts 
believed that the nation was on the threshold of an enormous market for mass transit design, 
engineering, construction, and equipment. 
 Pittsburgh had suffered from traffic congestion for most of the twentieth century. The 
rugged, hilly topography constrained travel to narrow valleys and river floodplains, forcing the 
construction of tunnels that proved to be bottlenecks in the flow of traffic. The confining physical 
geography of the "Golden Triangle", the peninsular downtown crammed between the Allegheny 
and Monongahela rivers where they meet to form the Ohio River, especially worsened the 
downtown traffic conditions. Beginning with Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr.'s, plan in 1911, 
Pittsburgh planners struggled throughout the years to provide an adequate highway network, 
while at the same time they neglected the various forms of mass transportation.10  Just as they had 
addressed long-standing environmental, redevelopment, and housing problems under the 
Renaissance banner, leaders naturally tried to solve the traffic problem of the region. In addition 
to building new limited access highways with tunnels, they wished to create an effective mass 
transportation system for Allegheny County. 
 The development of a public transportation system involves a complex network of 
intergovernmental arrangements among federal, state, and local governments. Differences in the 
political and bureaucratic objectives of these governmental units create problems, as does the 
strong tradition of local autonomy among municipalities. The pivotal governmental units for the 
Skybus rapid transit venture were Allegheny County, the City of Pittsburgh, and the Port 
Authority of Allegheny.  Other governmental units, including federal, state, local, and judiciary 
ones, were important to the Skybus story.  
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 Governmental fragmentation between the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County and 
among the 130 minor civil divisions of the County always presented problems for regional 
initiatives. Between the 1930s and the 1960s, the Democratic Party, centered in Pittsburgh, 
provided unity among the various elements of the City of Pittsburgh and Allegheny County 
governmental systems. The Democratic political machine informally coordinated and directed 
regional governmental policies. Although there was always some dissent, Democratic Party 
leaders managed conflict by brokering diverse interests of the various groups that brought rank 
and file Democrats into the coalition. 
 Political unity prevailed during the early stages of the planning a new rapid transit system.  
When legislation passed to create Port Authority Transit, David Lawrence, longtime Renaissance 
mayor and party boss, was the new governor of Pennsylvania. Close ally Joseph M. Barr was the 
newly-elected mayor of the City of Pittsburgh.  Dr. William D. McClelland chaired the 
Allegheny County Board of Commissioners with John D. McGrady the other Democratic 
Commissioner and Blair F. Gunther the Republican minority member. McClelland had been a 
political opponent of the Lawrence organization since 1954. However, he eventually supported 
Pittsburgh's interest in a rapid transit system.11 McGrady closely identified with the 
Lawrence-Barr organization, while even Republican Gunther supported the rapid transit strategy. 
Although the County Commissioners were responsible for implementing rapid transit, city 
government under Mayor Barr and his staff was the principal contact with the business 
community and a driving force in the creation of the rapid transit system. 
 Since World War II Pittsburgh business leaders under the auspices of Richard King 
Mellon strived to renew their smoky steel city. Working through the Allegheny Conference on 
Community Development (ACCD), Mellon and the presidents of the city's largest corporations 
created several non-profit organizations to carry out planning, renewal, and development. The 
Allegheny Conference exercised control over these diverse corporations and civic organizations 
through the power of the Mellon family interests in the business community and the interlocking 
appointments of corporate executives on boards of directors.  Mellon forged an informal 
partnership with Mayor David Lawrence as the leader of the Democratic Party, and together they 
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orchestrated the public/private partnership that implemented the various projects of 
Renaissance.12 
 Early in his administration, Barr stated his commitment to maintaining the private/public 
partnership and urban redevelopment that characterized the Lawrence era. In an article in the 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette in December 1959, Mayor Barr stated: "There will be no let up, I assure 
you, on the part of the government, or on the part of civic agencies, whose contributions have 
been so essential to the past accomplishments."13   The working relationship of the staffs of 
public and private agencies primarily maintained the public/private partnership in the Barr era. 
Aldo Colautti, executive secretary to Barr, can recall only two times when the mayor had 
personal meetings with Mellon. The Allegheny Conference remained the key private agency in 
maintaining this communication and setting the initiative for development.14   Ed Magee, 
Allegheny Conference executive director from 1959 to 1968, was a conservative man with a 
limited set of priorities for the development of the region. He had little or no concern about social 
issues. His development agenda was the continuation of the physical development started in the 
Lawrence era. His interest in new programs centered on building an all-sports stadium, mass 
transit, and, to a lesser extent, refurbishing the city’s zoo.15 
 Magee's major contact in the city administration was John Mauro, the mayor's urban 
renewal coordinator and later director of the city's Department of Planning and Development. 
Mauro began his career as a Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reporter and became the director of public 
relations at the Chamber of Commerce. After his work for the city, he moved on to roles as 
director of development for the Allegheny Conference and finally the executive director of the 
Port Authority of Allegheny County. Mauro's and Magee's common concerns for physical 
development were compatible.16 
 The media helped to forge a broad public consensus around goals of economic 
revitalization of the region. The media rallied and maintained support for revitalization by 
dramatically making visible its accomplishments.  In an interview years later, Walter Giesey 
reflected on the media's public relations role in the Pittsburgh Renaissance: “Again, looking 
back, I think that the newspapers had some responsibility in the eventual degeneration in almost 
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being too kind to the administration and to the Conference. If the Conference said this is good, it 
became automatically good. No one went out to find out whether everyone else thought it was 
good, that was the imprimatur and that was it, and so the Pittsburgh Press would say it was good 
and the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette would say it was good, and it was good.”17 
 Much of the momentum for Renaissance resulted from "selling" an image -- an illusion of 
the simplicity of redevelopment as a well-planned, fastidiously run, problem-free master 
operation. The same image was used to sell the rapid transit program.   
 
Skybus: PAT's Choice for Rapid Transit 
 On April 6, 1956 the state legislature passed the second-class Port Authority Act, which 
created the Port Authority of Allegheny County. The Port Authority had the power to plan, 
acquire, construct, maintain and operate facilities and projects for the improvement and 
development of the port district. Three years later the legislature passed an act enabling the Port 
Authority to purchase and operate mass transit facilities. The Allegheny County Commissioners 
appointed a Port Authority Transit [PAT] Board; and the Commissioners could approve, 
disapprove or direct revisions of proposals set forth by the new body. The legislature directed 
that "the Authority, immediately upon its organization, shall commence its study of an integrated 
system of mass transportation within the service area..."18 This requirement set into motion the 
series of events that led to PAT's adopting in 1959 the Early Action Program for rapid transit and  
subsequently to an innovative but controversial rubber wheel technology. 
 In June 1960 PAT hired the engineering firm of Coverdale & Colpitts to conduct a 
feasibility study for an integrated system of mass transportation. The resulting plan, accepted by 
PAT in 1961 and amended and adopted by the County Commissioners in 1963, recommended 
the consolidation of the Pittsburgh Railways Company (the trolley system), two inclines on Mt. 
Washington, and 30 bus companies into one operating system.  The Commissioners' decision 
came after considerable acrimony as to whether the issue of creating a county-wide transit system 
should be put to a referendum and whether it was a step toward metropolitanism.  Local 
municipal officials around the county, represented most vociferously by McKeesport Mayor 
 10 
Andrew J. Jakomas and Bethel Park Mayor Peter Page, feared the loss of autonomy. With county 
and federal funds PAT immediately began the implementation of this plan. As acquisition of 
extant companies progressed, PAT was also considering futuristic designs and exclusive 
rights-of-way for carriers in order to provide rapid transit.19 
 In June 1963 PAT became a founding partner in the demonstration project for 
Westinghouse Electric Corporation's futuristic Transit Expressway System (called locally 
Skybus). Responding to the blandishments of urban experts and civic leaders, the federal 
government and state counterparts had begun in the early 1960s granting financial assistance for 
the upgrading of local mass transportation systems as well as for experimental transit programs. 
In one of these initiatives, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, soon to become the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), put up matching funds for the 
construction and operation of Westinghouse's innovative Skybus system in order to test its 
feasibility for medium density urban areas. The high capital and operating costs of conventional 
rail transit presumably prohibited its use in medium density markets. 
 Already under consideration for Tampa's airport, Westinghouse's technology offered, it 
was argued, advantages of modern comfort, lower operating costs, and route flexibility for 
Pittsburgh's rugged topography. Civic leaders may have already had Westinghouse's design 
concept in mind when the City of Pittsburgh, the Golden Triangle Association, and the Pittsburgh 
Regional Planning Association adopted the Golden Triangle Master Plan in June 1962, which 
included "recommendations for an automated rapid transit system serving areas to the east and 
south of the Triangle."20   PAT joined HUD, the State of Pennsylvania, Westinghouse, and two 
dozen other corporations (many from Pittsburgh) in financing the $5,000,000 Transit Expressway 
Mass Transit Demonstration Project.21 
 Although HUD Secretary Robert C. Weaver did not dedicate Skybus until January 1966, 
Westinghouse initiated operation of its trains on a 1.77 mile demonstration loop in South Park in 
early August 1965. The electric, automatically controlled (i.e., unmanned) and rubber wheeled 
vehicles, operating individually or in trains, ran at speeds as high as 50 mph along an elevated 
steel frame, concrete surfaced roadway. Together the vehicles and roadway were designed to 
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provide the comfort and convenience necessary to attract commuters accustomed to their private 
automobiles. In this initial project, Skybus operated for 10 months, covering 21,000 vehicle miles 
and providing rides to the public during four days of the Allegheny County Fair.22  
 Three months after the South Park demonstration began and only weeks after President 
Lyndon Johnson signed a law to stimulate rapid transit, PAT took another essential step in the 
development of rapid transit in Allegheny County.  In late October 1965 with money provided by 
the state, PAT authorized Parsons, Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas [PBQD] to prepare a plan for 
rapid transit, which included an evaluation of the rubber wheel Skybus system.23 In hiring PBQD, 
PAT obtained the engineering firm that had done the planning work for the Bay Area Rapid 
Transit system (BART) under construction in the San Francisco Bay area.  BART was the 
nation's boldest development in rapid transit at the time. PAT charged PBQD to investigate all 
possible options and routes and produce estimates of feasible alternatives with the final report 
due in 1967. The results of this and a number of other studies undertaken in this period would 
strongly influence the fate of Skybus and its competitors. 
 PAT had been contemplating this step long before Fall 1965. In early 1964, six months 
after it had entered into the Skybus experiment, PAT board members informed the Executive 
Committee of the Allegheny Conference of their consideration of rapid transit and distributed a 
reprinted article about BART and PBQD.24 In summer 1964, PAT decided to end commuter 
railroad operations, allowing the Pennsylvania Railroad's remaining trains to stop running 90 
days later.  Its own hasty study of the Pennsylvania Railroad's service convinced Leland Hazard, 
Chairman of PAT’s Rapid Transit Committee, of the need for a comprehensive master plan for 
rapid transit in Allegheny County.  As a member of PAT's board and the corporate community, 
Hazard was a tireless, outspoken advocate for rapid transit.25 
 At the initiation of the PBQD study, PAT officials claimed that they had not yet 
determined the appropriate technology for rapid transit in Allegheny County despite participation 
in the Skybus demonstration at South Park.  However, by fall 1965 the operation and evaluation 
of Skybus was already in its early stages.  The existing two year relationship with Skybus, the 
discussion of futuristic solutions, the recommendation for automated transit in 1962 in the 
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Golden Triangle Master Plan, the canceling of commuter rail service in 1964, the concurrent 
targeting of the local rapid transit industry (discussed below), and HUD's interest in the Skybus 
technology surely had PAT Board members favorably disposed to Westinghouse's rubber wheel 
vehicles when they engaged PBQD.26 
 Skybus picked up momentum in early 1966 when PAT asked the Transportation Research 
Institute (TRI) at Carnegie Mellon University to study a distribution loop within downtown, 
which would use a similar design concept.  In December 1966 PAT further contracted with TRI 
to conduct studies of other technological aspects of Skybus.27 Then in 1967, when PBQD was 
still completing its work, confirmation of the technical feasibility of Westinghouse's system came 
from the local MPC Corporation's positive evaluation of the South Park demonstration, favorable 
results of TRI's studies, and a supportive evaluation by Richardson, Gordon and Associates 
(consulting engineers).  Early in 1967, MPC concluded that the Transit Expressway was a 
feasible technology for medium density markets and that the public, at least at South Park, 
accepted the concept of unmanned vehicles.  MPC also recommended additional design and 
engineering refinements as well as further evaluative demonstration.28 In April Allegheny County 
and Westinghouse each put up $200,000 to extend the testing of Skybus at South Park with the 
expectation that these investments would leverage $2,000,000 from state and federal sources for 
additional engineering and design work.  In September PAT Board member Leland Hazard 
announced the recommendation of the Transit Committee for building a Skybus demonstration 
line to the South Hills, noting in particular the unsuitability of steel rails for Pittsburgh's terrain.29   
Perhaps, Hazard's release of his committee's report before the release of the nearly completed 
PBQD study reflected rumors that the prestigious engineering firm favored steel wheel 
technology. 
 PBQD released its long awaited report on December 18, 1967.  The firm proposed rapid 
transit corridors to the eastern suburbs, North Hills, the Ohio Valley, and two to the South Hills, 
encompassing 60 miles in all and estimating costs of over $700,000,000.  PBQD did not 
expressly endorse one technological system, rubber tire or steel wheels.  Although newspaper 
articles about the report emphasized the choice between the two technologies, PAT's intention to 
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adopt Skybus seemed reasonably clear from the preceding studies and projects.30  Two days after 
the release of PBQD's report, Westinghouse received the first Urban Transportation Award given 
by HUD.  The Pittsburgh Press noted that "This commendation is particularly encouraging 
because the Allegheny County Port Authority Transit (PAT) hopes to receive $300,000 from 
HUD for a feasibility study of a plan to operate a Skybus between the South Hills and downtown 
Pittsburgh.  If all goes well, the next step would be construction of a $60,000,000 test line to be 
completed by 1970.”31 
 PAT's formal acceptance of the PBQD report in March 1968 positioned it to apply for 
federal financial assistance in designing and building a rapid transit system.  In August of the 
same year PAT's Transit Committee submitted to the PAT Board a 28 mile Early Action Program 
and proposed Westinghouse as the systems manager for the engineering study that would apply 
its Skybus design to the recommended South Hills demonstration line (this became known as 
TERL - Transit Expressway Revenue Line).32  With Westinghouse in place PAT applied to the 
Department of Transportation for a Technical Study Grant, which was approved on November 1, 
1968. Conditions of the grant made it clear that Westinghouse was not to participate in the final 
decision on the rapid transit technology used on the TERL corridor.33 
 Despite more than five years of close interaction with Westinghouse, PAT was not yet 
formally committed to the Skybus technology until the following summer when the technical 
grant was completed and PAT was ready to seek additional federal funding.  On July 10, 1969 
PAT ignored the last minute submission of an alternative steel wheel scheme, approved the Early 
Action Program to include Skybus on the South Hills line, and filed an application with the 
Urban Mass Transportation Administration of HUD (UMTA).  In September after public 
hearings, the Allegheny County Commissioners approved the program and agreed to the financial 
commitments it engendered.  On June 10, 1970 UMTA approved $8,700,000 for the project and 
added an additional $60,000,000 in September 1971.34 Although Westinghouse's Skybus now 
seemed certain to be built in Pittsburgh and to become a model for other medium density markets 
to consider for adoption, a discordant note to this process had appeared in the newspapers in 
early 1968, and a major fracture in civic unanimity surfaced and widened during the approval 
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process in summer 1969. At the time, however, few of Skybus' proponents realized how serious 
this fracture would be. 
 
Detroit of the Transit Industry 
 The strategy to make Pittsburgh the center of the rapid transit industry was closely 
entwined with the region's efforts to construct an innovative rapid transit system. The same 
coalition of public and private leaders, which had orchestrated the city's Renaissance after World 
War II, targeted the rapid transit industry for special attention.  Corporate leaders with the 
essential support of R.K. Mellon worked through non-profit organizations and partnered with 
PAT to promote a rapid transit system and industry.  
 Public officials at the local, state, and federal levels, who participated actively in the 
development of the rapid transit system (including Skybus), shared the industry targeting goals; 
but they were apparently, and quite logically, less involved in the targeting strategy itself. This 
distinction proved in the end to be a fatal weakness in the private-public coalition for the industry 
targeting objective.  By viewing targeting as a private sector program, some public officials who 
came into office late in the process felt little commitment to Skybus, especially as central to the 
targeting program, and were willing to accept an alternative technology for political expediency.  
 At the same time, the Skybus plan opened a fracture within the corporate community; and 
without the leadership of R. K..Mellon to hold it together, the private sector faded from the fray 
when conflict over Skybus erupted in the public arena.  The reasons for the corporate 
community's failure to continue its promotion of a local rapid transit industry after 1972 are 
unclear, but the federal government's weak financial support of urban mass transit in the 1970s 
more than likely deflected the interest of corporate planners to greener pastures.
35
 
 The idea that Pittsburgh might become the center of the rapid transit industry followed 
logically from both the region's contemporary experience and industrial history.  The desire to 
diversify its industrial structure and extend its redevelopment progress with rapid transportation 
fit comfortably with corporate strengths in transportation engineering and manufacturing and 
with the civic leadership's self confidence in effecting change.  Just as aircraft manufacturers saw 
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opportunities for new markets in the federal government's post-war goals to develop missile and 
space programs, corporations with ground transportation capabilities perceived growth potential 
in the government's emerging policy to encourage rapid transit in cities across the United States. 
 In a 1965 demonstration of rapid transit equipment for the future, U.S. Steel President 
Leslie Worthington cited the Census Bureau's projection that 75% of the nation's anticipated 
population would live in 300 metropolitan areas.36  After examining 42 cities most likely to build 
systems, the company estimated construction costs of "more than $8 billion dollars over the next 
15 years ... These systems offer a potential market for steel of about six million tons.”37   
Westinghouse Electric Corporation and Westinghouse Air Brake Company (WABCO) had been 
developing their transit capabilities for several years, undoubtedly in consultation with federal 
authorities.  Three top Westinghouse Electric executives stood among the invited dignitaries who 
witnessed President Lyndon Johnson sign the 1965 rapid transit bill authorizing $90,000,000 for 
research, development, and demonstration projects across the nation.  One month later 
Westinghouse President Donald C. Burnham brought his Board of Directors to South Park to see 
Skybus because he felt rapid transit systems would become an important factor in the company's 
future.38 
 Even though Pittsburgh's reputation rested on steel production, the area's businesses had a 
long involvement in various transportation industries.  Boat building along the banks of the three 
rivers began in the early years of the nineteenth century.  These boat yards initially turned out 
simple wooden rafts and keelboats, but graduated to more complicated steamboats that plied the 
inland waterways for the rest of the century.39  Long after the steamboat industry disappeared, 
local boat yards produced river barges and military landing craft for World War II, while area 
steel mills forged massive armor plates for U.S. Navy warships. 
 In the mid-nineteenth century, the rapid expansion of railroads across the continent 
triggered the transformation of Pittsburgh's iron rolling mills into a mass production steel 
industry that dominated the nation's production for decades.  In order to compete for the 
burgeoning railroad rail market, many local iron masters, most notably Andrew Carnegie and his 
associates, installed new technologies, vastly expanded the scale of production, and eventually 
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adopted modern management techniques.  Carnegie's Edgar Thomson works, which opened in 
Braddock in 1875, became the prototype integrated steel rail mill for the industry.40  At the same 
time, dozens of local foundries produced railroad wheels, axles, and frogs as well as mining cars 
that were in demand at the region's hundreds of coal mines and coke works.  By the early 
twentieth century, Pittsburgh manufacturers had become major suppliers of railroad equipment. 
Besides rails and spikes, local firms produced locomotives (notably H.K. Porter), railroad cars 
(e.g. Pullman Standard in Butler and Pressed Steel Car in McKees Rocks), steel wheels, axles, 
car couplers, boilers, engines, valves, and numerous other products.  There were more than a 
dozen major railroad repair shops.  Of special note were the brake and switching industries under 
George Westinghouse's control.  In the 1860s Westinghouse devised the railroad air brake and 
then followed over the next several decades with a succession of switching and signaling 
innovations. These developments resulted in the formation of the Westinghouse Air Brake 
Company as well as the Union Switch and Signal Company.41 
 With this background many Pittsburgh corporations and engineering firms were by the 
early 1960s deeply involved in designing products for the anticipated growth of the rapid transit 
market.  They established transit research centers within their own corporate structures and 
joined with other corporations, often local ones, in creating new products.  By 1962 WABCO 
brought several divisions together in its Mass Transit Center, including its Union Switch and 
Signal division, and was working on automated controls, braking gears, and other experimental 
equipment for Montreal's Expo '67, Newark's inter-terminal transit system, and San Francisco's 
BART.  In October 1965 the Pullman Company announced the creation of its Transportation 
Systems Center at its Pittsburgh rolling stock division in Butler and a working relationship with 
the Swindell-Dressler engineering and equipment group.  In cooperation with ALCOA, 
Edgewater Steel created an aluminum centered, steel wheel, which it tested with the Chicago 
Transit Authority and supplied to BART for experimental purposes.  In turn, ALCOA worked 
with railroad car manufacturers to devise increased uses of aluminum in the transit industry, 
some of which the Long Island Railroad tested.  U.S. Steel participated with other local 
companies such as PPG Industries and Midland Ross, an electronics equipment producer, in 
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fashioning its demonstration car called SCOT (Steel Car of Tomorrow).  Westinghouse Electric 
had been working on propulsion designs with BART and, of course, launched its Skybus 
demonstration project in June 1963. Among other local companies, Rockwell Manufacturing 
produced transit meters and compressor units, and the Koppers Company sold railroad ties and 
plastics for car interiors.42 
 Who initially recognized the advantages of a coordinated promotion of Pittsburgh's rapid 
transit industrial capabilities is not known.  The June 1963 agreement to build the South Park 
Skybus loop may have been the initial step in a coordinated effort, for it brought together public 
entities and several private companies in addition to Westinghouse.  County Commissioner Dr. 
William D. McClelland explicitly supported the Skybus demonstration because he believed it 
would lead to a new local industry and revitalize the industrial valleys.  Comments by 
Westinghouse executive George W. Jernstedt and McClelland in 1967, four years after the 
agreement, suggest that Skybus was an initial step in a strategy to help Westinghouse win 
contracts with BART.  At the January 1964 meeting of the Allegheny Conference's Executive 
Committee, Robert Ryan, then head of the Regional Industrial Development Corporation 
(RIDC), averred that in light of "the opportunities in the field of rapid transit" the implementation 
of the Golden Triangle Master Plan of 1962, which recommended an automated rapid transit 
system, held "great potentialities for the area in terms of increased employment and economic 
growth." Ryan, once described as "an established trouble-shooter for the Mellon interests," may 
have merely reflected ideas commonly under discussion at the time in business circles, but he had 
brought them to the attention of the one organization, the Allegheny Conference, with the 
inclination, corporate perspective, and power to formulate an industry targeting effort.43 
 Whatever the inception date, the targeting strategy was publicly acknowledged and put 
into action by mid-1965.  In the typical Renaissance manner, the Chamber of Commerce under 
the auspices of the Allegheny Conference and with participation of public officials launched a 
new organization to spearhead the effort only a month before Westinghouse began operation of 
its Skybus demonstration at South Park.  At a June 1965 luncheon chaired by R. K. Mellon at the 
prestigious Duquesne Club, Chamber of Commerce President Henry Avery announced the 
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formation of the Urban Transportation Development Council (later simply called the Urban 
Transportation Council or UTC).44   Mayor Barr, corporate presidents, and representatives of the 
newspapers attended the luncheon.  J. Stanley Purnell, an assistant to the president of T. Mellon 
& Sons, chaired the new council of 16 business and civic leaders, including representatives from 
PAT, trade associations, and engineering, metal and material firms.  He described the UTC's 
mission as bringing "world wide" attention to Pittsburgh “as a center of mass transit production 
and design", conducting events that would bring local companies into contact with potential 
customers and thereby creating jobs with the subsequent expansion of business.  Moreover, 
Purnell added the objective to "push solution of Pittsburgh's own mass transit ... problems."45  As 
its first effort to achieve these goals, the UTC scheduled an international conference on mass 
transportation for early February 1966. 
 By the beginning of the conference, the construction of rapid transit in Allegheny County 
and the development of the local industry had been publicly linked as complementary elements 
of the targeting strategy.  Upon President Johnson's signing of the transportation bill in late 
September 1965, both corporate leaders and PAT officials predicted to local newspapers that it 
would be a stimulus to the local transit industry.  Local politicians such as State Senator Robert 
D. Fleming as well as the daily newspapers urged the region not to fall behind other cities and to 
keep Renaissance moving forward.46  PAT officials presented their hopes for rapid transit at the 
annual dinner meeting of the Allegheny Conference; their prominence on the meeting's agenda 
reflected the Conference's support for not only a rapid transit system but also the local transit 
industry.47  In a January 1966 presentation to the Kiwanis Club, Gene R. Schaefer, Director of 
WABCO's mass transit center, linked the construction of a rapid transit system in Pittsburgh with 
the promotion of the local industry.  Schaefer predicted that by the early 1970s Pittsburgh would 
be building a rapid transit system because of the capabilities of local industry.  Pittsburgh would 
"become the most prominent city in mass transit -- not only as a supplier but also from an 
operating standpoint."48 
 Momentum for the targeting strategy continued to mount.  One week after Schaefer's 
speech, 200 industrial and civic leaders attended the formal dedication of Skybus at South Park. 
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Both PAT Chairman Judge Loran L. Lewis and County Commissioner McClelland told reporters 
that this experiment could result in an important new industry for the region.49  A little more than 
two weeks later on the eve of the initial UTC conference, the Pittsburgh Post Gazette recognized 
the role that an operating rapid transit system could play for local industry.  The editors hoped 
that "Pittsburgh will demonstrate through the construction of its own rapid transit system just 
what its industries are capable of doing.  Nothing is more persuasive than a going concern.”50 
RIDC's Ryan argued explicitly that developing a rapid transit system for Pittsburgh was a critical 
part of an industry targeting strategy.  Since his organization was created in 1955 to help 
diversify the local economy, he may have been in the best position to be a spokesman. According 
to the Pittsburgh Press' report, Ryan warned "This city can become an urban transportation 
center only by demonstrating its own capabilities in the industry on its own home grounds. This 
will require total commitment by public officials and agencies.”51  Ironically, at this early date 
Ryan also hit upon both weaknesses in the region's targeting strategy when he recognized the 
corporate competition among local firms for these markets and the need for total public 
commitment to rapid transit among the region's transit producers. 
 With the convening of the First International Conference on Urban Transportation on 
February 1, 1966, the city made its pitch.  As conference organizer, the UTC hoped to further the 
cause of urban rapid transit nationwide and focus attention on Pittsburgh as a center for the 
research, design, and production of transit equipment and systems.52  More than 1,000 people 
from around the nation attended the three-day affair. Topics and speakers reflected the national 
agenda for rapid transit. The local agenda was made explicit by an exhibit of local companies' 
transit capabilities -- almost a trade fair as one participant observed -- and tours of Skybus at 
South Park and local industrial plants.53  Indeed, some participants complained to the New York 
Times that they were "tricked into attending a local chamber of commerce promotion", a lament 
that was in part correct.54 
 The announcement at the conference of the formation of the Transportation Research 
Institute at Carnegie Institute of Technology (soon to be renamed Carnegie Mellon University) 
emphasized the city's commitment to the rapid transit industry.  Supported by an initial grant of 
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$300,000 by R. K. Mellon through the A. W. Mellon Educational and Charitable Trust, TRI 
aspired to become an international center for transit research and information.55  The conference 
gained the active involvement of Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton, Mayor Barr, and 
other local public officials.  Perhaps, County Commissioner McClelland's widely reported 
comment that he believed county voters would support a referendum on rapid transit signified 
some success in achieving the conference organizers' desire to solidify the politicians' 
commitment to local transit policy and to targeting the local industry.56  The indomitable Ryan 
captured the general satisfaction with the outcome of the conference when he reckoned it had 
given the city a boost towards becoming "Detroit of the transit industry", an industry expected to 
soon be worth billions of dollars.57 
 Over the next two years, the Detroit analogy became a common refrain.  While PAT 
moved towards the seemingly inevitable adoption of a rapid transit plan with the Skybus 
technology, the corporate community pursued its goal of promoting the local rapid transit 
industry.  Three weeks after the first transportation conference in February 1966, members of 
both the downtown Golden Triangle Association and the Building Owners and Managers 
Association visited Toronto to inspect its transportation system.58  In the spring, the state awarded 
WABCO a grant to study high speed railroad service between Pittsburgh and Harrisburg.  In 
announcing the grant, Pennsylvania Secretary of Commerce John K. Tabor allowed that even if 
WABCO were to determine such a rail route infeasible, the study would help establish 
Pennsylvania's capabilities in the transportation industry.  Having missed the automobile, radio, 
aviation, missile, electronics, and space industries, the state, he argued, could not be allowed to 
miss this new one.59 
 As with the initial symposium, the Second International Conference on Urban 
Transportation acted as a lightening rod for announcements intended to publicize the city's march 
towards becoming the capital of the rapid transit industry.  UTC Chairperson Purnell told the 
Allegheny Conference that the April 1967 event would focus on solutions to rush hour 
congestion and highlight industry's research and development role.60 During the week preceding 
the conference, several announcements seemed timed to impress the conferees, the industry, and 
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the city with the progress achieved towards the industry targeting goal.  Mellon made a second 
grant to the Transportation Research Institute, this one for $700,000.  WABCO revealed that it 
had received a $370,000 grant from HUD to examine all types of mass transit, including 
Skybus.61  But most dramatically, Westinghouse announced the decision to locate its new 
corporate transportation center in the nearby suburb of Forest Hills because of, General Manager 
Jernstedt explained, the cooperation and commitment of Allegheny County and other public 
officials towards Skybus in South Park.  That commitment, he added, helped Westinghouse win 
the Tampa airport transit business and a $26,000,000 contract with BART, which would result in 
100 local production jobs.  As a result, the county and the corporation agreed to commit more 
funds towards Skybus.62  Then, on the first day of the conference, new Pennsylvania Governor 
Raymond P. Shafer called for a ten-year $300,000,000 commitment by the state for intercity and 
mass transportation, and named PAT's Hazard to head a Governor's Committee on 
Transportation.63 
 A Pittsburgh Post Gazette reporter, Thomas M. Hritz, laid out the targeting strategy in an 
article on The Second Conference.  Hritz identified Mellon, Purnell, Hazard, John W. Dameron 
(Executive Director of PAT), and ALCOA Chairman Frederick J. Close as "key figures behind 
the conference and transportation here" and saw the conference as a means to harness the city's 
"vast industrial powers" towards a common end.  He quoted Purnell as saying, "In order to insure 
success, the power structure was pulled out."  Even competing companies realized they had much 
to lose and joined forces behind the conference.64  As if to secure this corporate cooperation and 
that of public officials, the UTC filed for incorporation later in the year. While the incorporators 
were the familiar figures of U. S. Steel's Worthington, ALCOA'S Close, PAT’s Hazard, RIDC’s 
Ryan, and Mellon’s Purnell, the directors included the presidents of many other major 
corporations, (most of whom were Executive Committee members of the Allegheny Conference), 
I. W. Abel of the United Steelworkers, the chairmen of PAT, RIDC and the Chamber of 
Commerce, the President of Carnegie Mellon University, and key public officials -- Governor 
Shafer, Mayor Barr, and County Commissioner Leonard Staisy.65  The successful Renaissance 
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formula of public and private cooperation orchestrated by the Mellon interests and the Allegheny 
Conference was being repeated. 
 Events of 1968 -- as noted earlier, PAT's acceptance of the PBQD report, submission of 
the Early Action Program by PAT's Rapid Transit Committee, and Washington's approval of the 
technical grant to study TERL with Westinghouse as systems manager -- all seemed to confirm 
that rapid transit with the Skybus technology and industry targeting of the transportation industry 
were moving rapidly towards a successful conclusion.  Only a few weeks after PAT applied for 
the technical grant in September 1968, public officials joined representatives of 15 local firms, 
including both Westinghouse and WABCO to inspect the different transit technologies operating 
in Montreal and Toronto.66 Thus, during the waning months of 1968 the public/private 
partnership appeared firmly in place and rapid transit securely part of the county’s future.  The 
strategy for targeting the local rapid transit industry looked like a winner. 
 
The Strategy Falters 
 Cooperation among the rapid transit players, however, was not to be long lived; in fact, it 
did not survive the decade. A few key public officials broke ranks from the generally broad-based 
political support and shattered the partnership with private organizations, objecting to the elite 
bias of their interests and behind-closed-doors style of decision-making.  At the same time 
WABCO's challenge to the Early Action Program and Westinghouse's Skybus technology broke 
the unanimity of the corporate community.  Both fractures revealed weaknesses in the 
long-standing Renaissance formula, which had come about due to changes in leadership and 
political context.  When the omnipotent old leaders of the public/private partnership died -- both 
Mellon and Lawrence -- stresses in the coalition could not be contained.  Moreover, the public's 
growing distrust of elite forms of power in the late 1960s, violence following Martin Luther 
King’s assassination, and intensification of civil rights and neighborhood activism provided the 
opportunity for new political leaders to discredit and attack the Renaissance partnership. 
 In 1967, the Democratic Lawrence-Barr era was coming to an end, and the consensus 
among business and political leaders began to unravel.  Lawrence died in 1966.  A few public 
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leaders with different agendas began to seek power.  Although in 1967 the Democratic 
organization managed to elect two new County Commissioners faithful to the rapid transit 
program (Leonard Staisey of the Monongahela Valley and former State Representative Tom 
Foerster), a less friendly Republican William L. Hunt defeated Blair Gunther for the minority 
commissioner position.  Hunt was an aggressive partisan from the Monongahela Valley who 
united with elected officials from the Valley’s industrial towns, especially Republican Mayor 
Zoran Popovich of McKeesport, to oppose the Early Action Program on the grounds that the 
Valley had been left without planned routes.  The McKeesport mayor's opposition to Skybus, and 
that of several other municipalities, reflected the acrimonious debate over creating a county-wide 
mass transit system in 1963.  McKeesport's mayor at the time, Andrew J. Jakomas, had feared 
that consolidating local transit (mostly bus) companies was a step toward the creation of a 
metropolitan-wide government at the expense of municipal autonomy.  Suburban communities 
throughout Allegheny County had feared metropolitanism since the beginning of the century, and 
the reappearance of this opposition should have been anticipated. 
 In 1967 the Barr administration's attention was being diverted from physical 
redevelopment.  Many factors caused this reorientation, including the demands of the civil rights 
and welfare rights movements, anti-Vietnam War protests, the increasing number of categorical 
grants available to cities from the federal government for the development of new organizations 
to manage federal money, and the community's growing hostility to past renewal efforts.67 By 
1969 the Barr administration had experienced explosive riots, a revenue crisis, and strikes.  The 
riots immediately following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., on April 4
th
, 1968 
shocked the city and Barr.  He decided not to run for re-election.  At 63 years of age he had spent 
30 years in public life and was prepared to step aside.  In a public statement he said: "To be 
mayor of a major city means to be involved in the period of the greatest social challenge and 
change in our nation's history.  Never before has there been greater ferment and social conflict in 
our urban centers.”68 
 In the spring 1969 Democratic primary, Pittsburgh City Councilman Peter Flaherty 
defeated the organization’s candidate, Judge Harry Kramer, to be the Democratic 
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candidate for mayor.  Flaherty attacked the Lawrence/Barr organization and the public/private 
partnership symbolized by the Allegheny Conference on Community Development, which he 
described as "a top down elitist operation" that was inefficient, lacked fiscal soundness, and 
neglected Pittsburgh neighborhoods, especially African American areas.  He ran as "nobody's 
boy" without ties to the Democratic organization, labor, or the business community.  Once 
mayor, Flaherty replaced the directors of all departments, including the Planning Department and 
the Urban Redevelopment Authority, rupturing the important staff relationships that had 
implemented the public/private partnerships of Renaissance.69    
 While the political leadership was being transformed, the Allegheny Conference on 
Community Development also experienced change.  In the closing years of the decade Richard 
K. Mellon adopted a passive role in civic affairs and then died in June 1970.  After the civil 
rights riots and demands that followed the assassination of Martin Luther King in April 1968, 
new executive director of the Allegheny Conference, Robert Pease, presided over a change in the 
organization’s focus to "human renewal" emphasizing social and economic development, 
education, and employment training. The Conference's annual report in 1968 expressed the 
concern for social issues: 
 
"An urban crisis, more challenging and even more difficult of 
solution than the physical crisis of the 1940s, confronted Pittsburgh 
-- the problems of the urban poor, the black and white citizens in 
the deprived neighborhoods of our community where poverty, 
unemployment, crime, delinquency, poor housing, alienation and 
other corrosive forces of ghetto existence sap the vitality and 
strength of our urban life ...,”70 
The Conference resolved to help bring the urban poor into the main current of community life so 
that the city could realize its full potentialities.  This new focus on human renewal diverted 
energies from physical redevelopment and rapid transit, although it did not end the Conference's 
commitment to them.  
 In this changing political environment, WABCO disrupted the unity of the business 
community and smooth progress toward PAT's and the UTC's goals with the submission in July 
1969 of an alternative rapid transit plan.  There had been little public warning of this rupture 
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earlier in the spring, when the Renaissance partnership seemed to be functioning routinely.  In 
March at the Fourth International Conference on Urban Transportation, Allegheny County 
Commissioner Staisey announced that Skybus would be constructed.  His announcement drew 
public support from the heads of PAT, RIDC, and the Chamber of Commerce, all who believed 
that the UTC's original goals were now within sight.  In early April, Westinghouse Chairman of 
the Board Donald Burnham assured stockholders at the corporation's annual meeting that they 
were ready to build Skybus since no technical problems remained. These claims by Staisey and 
Burnham seemed to dispel nagging concerns about the steel rails versus rubber wheels 
technological issue left unresolved in the PBQD report and simmering during 1968. Two other 
concerns, recognized in a January 1968 Post Gazette editorial, high construction costs and the 
long time-frame for completion of the new system, still loomed in the background.71 
 At an evening, closed-door executive session of the PAT Board on July 8, 1969, 
WABCO officials presented their PAT-METRO rail transit plan for Allegheny County as an 
alternative to the Early Action Program, which PAT was set to adopt formally in order to proceed 
with a grant proposal for financial assistance from the Department of Transportation.  The Board 
had expected to hear limited revisions to the proposed South Hills Skybus line.  Instead, it faced 
a proposal for a complete system that differed from the Early Action Program in many significant 
respects.  WABCO proposed a 28 mile, steel wheel on steel rail line from East Liberty in the 
city’s East End through downtown to the South Hills.  Company officials emphasized that the 
plan could be implemented without disrupting current trolley service, depended on proven 
technology, employed modern Metro cars that could be either automatically or manually 
operated, and used extant rights-of-way with no grade level crossings.  Most importantly, the 
WABCO system would cost only $114,000,000, half of the Skybus-busway program.72   Despite 
a telegram from Democratic mayoral candidate Pete Flaherty urging no action until the WABCO 
plan could be studied, the Board approved the Early Action Program, which included Skybus, on 
a 7-2 vote only two days later at its regularly scheduled meeting, filed the grant application with 
HUD, and asked for Allegheny County's commitment to a requisite $4,000,000 supplement to the 
$8,700,000 HUD proposal.73 
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 Allegheny County Commissioner Thomas Foerster, a Skybus proponent, scheduled a 
public hearing on PAT’s request for the county’s financial commitment because such a 
commitment was, in effect, public policy.  The hearing provided the opportunity for those 
opposed to Skybus to air their case against the Early Action Program.  WABCO did not wait for 
the hearings scheduled one month later in August and instead released its plan to the press the 
day after its presentation to the PAT executive committee. The controversy had now migrated to 
the public arena. WABCO's indiscretion angered PAT Board chairperson William Henry, Senior 
Vice President of Gulf Oil Corporation, and he declared that the $114,000,000 figure was grossly 
underestimated.74  On behalf of PAT, he engaged local engineering firm Michael Baker, Jr. 
Incorporated to evaluate the WABCO plan before the hearings, especially the cost projections.  
Michael Baker adjusted the figure upwards by $104,000,000, making Skybus' estimated cost 
competitive.  The consultant submitted its report immediately before the hearings, leaving 
WABCO little opportunity to examine the methodology and respond effectively.75 
 For Pittsburgh and Allegheny County a lot seemed to be riding on the outcome of the 
commissioners' hearing when it began on August 20, 1969.  The Department of Transportation in 
Washington expressed concern over the rift in the community, threatening the millions of dollars 
it was predisposed to award for local rapid transit and, hence, jeopardizing the very existence of 
rapid transit in the region.  The technologies of the region's two major rapid transit 
manufacturers, WABCO and Westinghouse, were pitted against each other in this public forum.  
More than the transit futures of these two key corporations were at risk; the community's industry 
targeting strategy had also arrived at a perilous juncture.  According to the Pittsburgh Press, one 
transportation official ironically noted, "The industry wants to see if the community that bills 
itself as the transit capital of the world can solve its own mass transit problems."76 
 Led by mayoral candidate Flaherty and Republican County Commissioner Hunt, the 
opposition raised technological, financial, and social concerns and attacked the elite nature of the 
PAT Board.  Recognizing the new 'power-to-the-people' temper of the late 1960s and riding the 
populist wave that was propelling his mayoral campaign, Pete Flaherty charged the PAT Board 
as being representative of the business community, because two-thirds of its members were 
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corporate executives.  In his view, the Board was a creature of the Renaissance public/private 
partnership with a propensity to exclude the public from its secretive decisions, which reflected 
business interests and perspectives.  Since tax revenues would build rapid transit, the public had 
the right to full disclosure and participation in the process through its elected representatives. 
However, as an authority, not an elected body, PAT, Flaherty charged, operated paternalistically 
and without accountability.  He argued that such a position could no longer be tolerated. 
 
"In short, the whole issue of rapid transit up until now has been ... a 
private affair of the PAT Board. My own experience at the PAT 
Board meetings ... was not one of welcome receptivity. The tone of 
the Board toward public suggestions was to look upon such 
suggestions as minor intrusions. In my own case it was as though I 
were interrupting the usual order of business ... Their tone is not 
one of 'the public be damned' but rather --- 'We know best'”.77 
 Although in a manner more appropriate to its status as a full member of the corporate 
community, WABCO echoed Flaherty's position by complaining that PAT had not allowed time 
for a proper response and tried to muzzle its Metro plan. Flaherty concluded that "an emotional 
commitment by the majority of the PAT Board and the Pittsburgh industrial establishment to the 
Skybus plan" precluded change in the plan filed in Washington.78 Flaherty's opposition to the 
technology was a direct attack on the feasibility of the Westinghouse rapid transit system. 
Despite the various engineering studies that certified Skybus, Flaherty continued to raise doubts 
about the safety and reliability of the automated, unmanned trains.  More than 20 years later, 
(then county commissioner) Flaherty offered the following scenarios to illustrate his fears: 
 
Picture, if you will, a young, female office worker in downtown 
Pittsburgh who finishes her workday and afterwards goes shopping 
or to a restaurant, and about 9:00 p.m. goes to the Skybus Station 
for her trip home to Mt. Lebanon. A Skybus car pulls into the 
station, automatically operated by a computer.  Doors open 
automatically after the car stops and a voice from a cassette says 
"Please enter." The young woman sees only two men on the car. If 
she gets on, she will be alone with two strangers through the tunnel 
and up into the first stop in Beechview.  An older couple in their 
seventies get on at South Hills Junction to go downtown. On the 
way, an electrical storm or electrical malfunction causes a power 
failure.  The car stops on the concrete piers 40 feet or so above 
ground level. How do they get out?  It's somewhat like being on an 
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elevator between floors without power.  Vandals throw old tires 
and junk on the track. The train, which has no operator, plows into 
the debris and is jammed to a stop.  Passengers on board are placed 
in an unsafe situation.  Ice and snow storms have similar hazards if 
heavy enough. There are no snow plows up there (on the elevated 
routeway).79 
Flaherty argued further that the proposed routes did not serve enough of the poor and working 
people of the county and city.  Neither the Monongahela Valley, nor most of the city's 
neighborhoods, had access to the South Hills route.  Some studies agreed that the most densely 
populated corridor was to the east, running through the city to the near suburbs. If Skybus or any 
fixed route system were to be built, the eastern route was the logical choice. However, this route 
went through at least one and most likely two of the largest African-American neighborhoods in 
the region. In contrast, the proposed route to the South Hills connected white middle class 
suburbs to the city’s downtown. In the rising spirit of populism and civil rights militancy of the 
late 1960s, it was difficult to defend this apparently biased choice of route.80 
 Flaherty's prediction that PAT's and the Allegheny Conference's commitment to Skybus 
was too strong to change proved to be correct. The county commissioners split along party lines 
to approve the Early Action Program at their September 23rd meeting. The majority reasoned 
that an innovative rapid transit system would likely attract federal aid, which was at a "premium," 
and would "lay the groundwork for Allegheny County to become the rapid transit center of the 
world.”81   
 The targeting vision was still in tact, but relationships among the strategy's partners had 
changed. The hearings might have been seen as only an irritant to the plans of PAT and the UTC 
because funding, design work, and even some construction on the Early Action Program 
proceeded for the next two years.  Nevertheless, the opposition had found its voice in the summer 
of 1969 and drove the publicity and controversy-shy business community into the shadows at a 
time when its former leader, R. K. Mellon, was no longer able to enforce corporate unity.  The 
presentation and acrimonious public discussion of WABCO's Metro plan disrupted, and in the 
end doomed, the industry targeting strategy.  Further, the election of Democrat Flaherty as mayor 
ruptured the essential partnership between public officials and private leaders.  
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 In the wake of the hearings, civic leaders moved to shore up support for the Early Action 
Program, although discordant notes reappeared at awkward moments.  While Barr remained 
mayor for a few more months and a supporter of PAT's plans, the Chairman of the City Planning 
Commission, David Olbum, addressed one of the criticisms of PAT in a letter to the county 
commissioners, writing that "there has been better coordination among the various agencies on 
this project than on any other development within the memory of the Planning Commission" and 
urging "prompt approval on the Early Action Program.82  In late October long time proponent of 
Skybus and close Mellon associate Robert Ryan was named chairman of the UTC, replacing 
former U. S. Steel President Leslie Worthington who had originally taken the post at Mellon's 
urging. The contract of UTC's executive director, former U. S. Steel executive Robert Hardin, 
was not renewed. These steps signaled the UTC's active advocacy of Skybus, which it endorsed 
"minutes after Ryan's election." Worthington and Hardin had not publicly endorsed either of the 
competing technologies.  U. S. Steel was believed to be sympathetic to WABCO's steel wheel 
technology, while ALCOA supported Westinghouse's Skybus.  The changes offered further 
evidence of disharmony within the business community over the issue.83 
 At PAT's request, consulting engineers Richardson, Gordon and Associates issued a 
report in January 1970, stating its judgment that Skybus was "not only entirely feasible but very 
practical." Then, in early February the Executive Committee of the Allegheny Conference voted 
to endorse the Early Action Program after listening to reports on it as well as Commissioner 
Hunt's opposition.84  The following week, however, concern over Skybus as a federally financed 
project was expressed in the U.S. Senate, and a delegation from McKeesport presented its 
opposition to the Department of Transportation's (DOT) legal department. The Transport 
Workers Union also expressed disapproval.85  While these remonstrations delayed approval of 
PAT's application for funds, DOT did finally grant the $8,700,000 in June 1970.  DOT also 
requested its Bureau of Public Roads and NASA Electronics Research Center to evaluate the 
technical issues of the proposed system.  Although Kaiser Engineers on behalf of Los Angeles 
and the city of Baltimore rejected the Skybus technology, DOT's reviews "concluded that there 
was no engineering basis to raise significant questions." In August 1971, DOT awarded an 
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additional $60,000,000 to PAT.86  By the end of 1971, the Pittsburgh City Council and other 
appropriate municipalities expressed their support, and both the county and state pledged 
commitment of capital expenditures for which they were responsible. Moreover, PAT had 
undertaken eminent domain proceedings, land purchase agreements, and some initial 
construction contracts.87 
 Just as Skybus, and possibly Pittsburgh's industry targeting project, was poised to become 
a reality, the opposition filed a preliminary injunction on January 19, 1972 to stop construction. 
Mayor Flaherty used legal delaying tactics, such as not issuing construction permits to renovate 
the tunnel through Mt. Washington, blocking the sale of city land to PAT for its Midtown Plaza 
station, and vetoing the plan in City Council (which it reversed).  Finally, Flaherty and Mayor 
Peter Page of suburban Bethel Park marshaled mayors of several municipalities to join with him 
and Commissioner Hunt in filing suit against PAT's Early Action Program. 
 After six months of hearings and legal procedures, Judge Anne X. Alpern issued the 
injunction. The opposition had taken a costly step, for as Secretary of Transportation 
John Volpe informed Mayor Flaherty the federal funds had been granted only for the Early 
Action Program.  New applications would have to be filed for a different proposal. When new 
Pennsylvania Governor Shapp, a Democrat, withdrew his support in the Fall of 1972, and hence 
state funding, the strategy of building a local rapid transit industry on the back of a local rapid 
transit system that employed the Skybus technology foundered.88  The injunction underscored the 
collapse of the public/private partnership.  In suing PAT, public officials also indirectly attacked 
the Allegheny Conference, which was committed to PAT's Early Action Plan and the creation of 
a local rapid transit industry. 
 Although Judge Alpern's decision was reversed on appeal in early 1973 by the State 
Supreme Court, the Skybus program was hopelessly deadlocked.  Federal support remained for 
Skybus, but there was so much local controversy that a new study was proposed to evaluate the 
alternatives.  The county commissioners formed a Transit Task Force in 1972.  Winning both the 
Democratic and Republican primaries, Flaherty easily won re-election in November 1973.  The 
Allegheny Conference under the new presidency of Robert Dickey III, chairman of Dravo 
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Corporation, recognized that a working relationship with the mayor was essential for the 
continued redevelopment of the region, and therefore, it might have to diminish its support for 
Skybus.89 
 Task Force members came from all levels of government and the Port Authority. PAT 
Board member John P. Robin chaired the task force.  Robin, the first executive of the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh and a central figure in Pittsburgh's Renaissance, had not 
been involved in the development of the rapid transit strategy or the controversy.  Widely 
respected by all parties, he was the ideal person to seek a compromise for transit. Under the 
specter of losing federal funds, the Task Force selected a consultant through a method that 
dispelled concerns of a biased process. In 1976, the consultant's report recommended abandoning 
Skybus and opted for less controversial exclusive bus lanes, the upgrading of the trolleys to a 
light rail system to the South Hills, and construction of a downtown subway loop.  Construction 
of the light rail system began five years later. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Skybus struggle generated so much animosity within Pittsburgh business and 
political communities that the industry targeting strategy became unattainable and was 
abandoned.  In the end, the “new center” for the design, promotion, and production of rapid 
transit systems could not produce its own local system. 
 Although in the beginning optimism prevailed, Pittsburgh’s industry targeting effort 
failed because political support waned for the centerpiece of the strategy, the building of an 
innovative rapid transit system for the region.  Political opponents of the city’s traditional civic 
leadership found in the Skybus program several opportunities to press an attack.  The feasibility 
of Skybus technology in terms of local topography, weather, and most especially safety remained 
in question despite the numerous studies supporting the system.  A decision to run the 
demonstration line on an active route rather than under controlled conditions at South Park might 
have proven its viability, won over the public, and quieted critics who used the technical doubts 
to arouse public fears.90 Suburban communities also saw in a county-wide mass transportation 
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system the threat of metropolitanism, by which they could eventually lose their autonomy to the 
city’s politicians.  This longstanding concern had been aroused during the 1963 controversy over 
the decision by the county commissioners to consolidate transit into a single system, and had not 
had time to dissipate.91  Moreover, industrial towns of the Monongahela Valley and the African-
American community of the city’s East End , which were not served by the Early Action 
Program’s route to the more affluent and white South Hills suburbs, felt neglected once again by 
the region’s power brokers and gave their support to Skybus’ opponents.  Even the United 
Steelworkers union registered displeasure with a technology that did not use steel rails. 
 In the 20 years after World War II, political opposition to Renaissance projects could not 
overcome the power of David Lawrence’s Democratic Party organization working in an alliance 
with Richard K. Mellon and the corporate community and supported by a cheerleading media.  
However, the civil rights movement, rising populism, and increasing community activism in the 
1960s undermined the party organization and encouraged challenges to the elite-based, top-down 
decision-making structure that characterized post-war redevelopment in Pittsburgh.  The death of 
David Lawrence further weakened the party, while civic leaders were slow to appreciate the 
changing political landscape.  Confident in their power to push through their transit program, as 
they had with other Renaissance programs for 20 years, public leaders failed to build a broad-
based consensus behind Skybus.  PAT, for example, never studied the likely positive impact of 
building and operating a rapid transit system on employment and income in the region.  Nor did 
PAT adequately justify its selection of the South Hills route over the more obvious eastern 
corridor.  Comprehending this new political environment, non-organizational Democratic 
candidate for mayor, Pete Flaherty, and Republican County Commissioner William Hunt used 
the Skybus program as an example of back-room, secretive decision-making to attack 
successfully their opponents in the 1969 election year. 
 In attacking Skybus, they also were attacking the Allegheny Conference and the corporate 
community at a time when it was most vulnerable.  Late in the approval process key companies 
decided to no longer subordinate their self interest for the larger regional industry targeting 
strategy.  Westinghouse and WABCO’s fight over rubber wheel or steel wheel technology 
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brought a private fight into the public fray, while a few other companies, in particular U.S. Steel, 
also failed to unite behind the strategy.  Previously, Richard K. Mellon had enforced corporate 
unity for Renaissance goals, but by the late 1960s the ailing business leader had withdrawn from 
civic battles.  Further, the private partners of the Renaissance alliance, used to getting their way, 
misjudged the power of the emerging opposition.  They failed to heed the warning signs of 
municipal dissent and corporate disagreement and to take the steps necessary to neutralize the 
opposition.  When Flaherty won the mayoral election, he ended the partnership between the 
mayor’s office and the Allegheny Conference.  The region could no longer present an united 
front when applying for funds at the state and federal levels. 
 Pittsburgh’s efforts to target the rapid transit industry in the 1960s underscore the 
inherently political nature of industry targeting as a regional economic development strategy.  
Whatever the methodological problems in selecting the targeted industry, implementation of a 
development program for that industry usually involves supportive public policies.  Pittsburgh’s 
strategy of showcasing the local rapid transit industry by holding promotional conferences and, 
most critically, building its own rapid transit system linked industrial development to local 
infrastructure needs, and therefore, to a local political decision-making process.  Policies that 
favor some companies over others within the local industry, such as occurred in Pittsburgh, may 
open rifts that weaken private sector support.  Changes in local civic leadership, as well as in the 
local political landscape like those that occurred in the city in the late 1960s, may undermine the 
ability of public officials to deliver necessary public policies. Thus, the public part of the 
targeting strategy may fall victim to political fights that may not be essentially concerned with the 
merits of industry targeting.  Division within the private sector and conflicts among local 
politicians, in turn, prevent a region from presenting an unified civic front that is often requisite 
in obtaining state and federal financial commitments. 
 The Skybus technology never really disappeared from the transportation market place.  It 
is used in a few communities, such as Morgantown, West Virginia, and many airports.  But, its 
demise as a rapid transit system in Pittsburgh also spelled the demise of the regional effort to 
target the local rapid transit industry for development.  Ironically, 20 years later the Pittsburgh 
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region once again targeted a local transit industry based on a new technology, magnetic 
levitation, tied to the construction of public infrastructure, and dependent on obtaining federal 
funds.  This effort, known as MAGLEV, quietly dissolved in the face of numerous policy hurdles 
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